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Monetary Targeting with
Exchange Rate Constraints:
The Bundesbank in the 1980s
ECENT programs for international coordi-
nation of economic policies have focused on the
control of exchange rate movements among the
major industrial countries. Such efforts gained
visibility in the 1985 Plaza Agreement among
the G5 nations (the United States) Canada,
France Germany and the United Kingdom) to
curb the rising dollar, and in the subsequent
joint efforts to prevent it from falling too low.1
Discussions of exchange rate coordination often
neglect the potential conflict between exchange
rate targets and domestic monetary policy objec-
tives. Exchange rate policies may be costly,
because a central bank may lose the ability to
control domestic money growth and, hence, the
domestic rate of inflation, in the effort to con-
trol exchange rates.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the
impact of exchange rate policies on domestic
monetary control during the iSSOs for one of
the main players in the international arena, the
German Bundesbank. The Bundesbank presents
a particularly interesting case- On the one hand,
it maintains a formal, explicit commitment to
monetary targeting. On the other hand, ft en-
gages in exchange rate stabilization policies both
inside the European Monetary System (EMS) and
vis-a1vis the US, dollar. ReceniJy, a number of
authors have concluded that these joint commit-
ments do not lead to significant conflict among
the Bundesbank’s policy objectives.2 Specifically,
they argue that its participation in the EMS and
in coordinated exchange rate policies in the G5
does not affect the Bundesbank’s ability to
achieve its monetary targets.
The analysis in this paper suggests that this
conclusion is too optimistic for two reasons.
First, it neglects important institutional aspects
of the Bank’s operating procedure; second, it
neglects the fact that its exchange rate policies
are geared to two different markets, the EMS
and the dollar. When these aspects are taken in.
to account, the evidence shows that German
domestic money growth has been significantly
affected by the Bundesbanks exchange rate pol-
icies in at least five years over the decade
from 1979 to 1988.
1See Funabashi (1988).
28ofinger (1988), Camen (1986), Mastropasqua et al.




Shortly after the 1973 breakdown of the Bret-
ton Woods system of fixed exchange rates,
which freed the Bundesbank from the obliga-
tion to intervene in the deutsche mark~U.S.
dollar market to maintain the fixed dollar pari-
ty, the Bundesbank established monetary tar-
geting as its monetary policy regime. A mone-
tary target was first announced in late 1974.
Monetary targeting has remained the basic
policy regime in Germany, although, occasional-
ly, changes have occurred in implementation
procedures.
The Bundesbank announces annual monetary
targets for a broad monetary aggregate. During
1975 to 1987, the targeted aggregate was the
“central hank money stock,” a weighted M3
monetary aggregatefr where MB is the sum of
currency in the non-bank sector, demand de-
posits and reserveable time and savings depos-
its. This aggregate is similar to the Federal
Reserves money stock definition for M2. In
1988, the Bank adopted the simple sum M3 as
its target aggregate. Between 1979 and 1987,
the targets were expressed as ranges of growth
rates from the fourth quarter to the fourth
quarter; only in 1989 the Bundesbank returned
to its pre-1979 practice of announcing a precise
fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter target growth
rate.
Reasons for Monetary Targeting
Annual monetary targets impose limits on
monetary policy activism and discretion. They
imply that, over a year’s time horizon, the cen-
tral banks actions have to be reconciled with its
targeted growth rate of the money supply. The
Bundesbank adopted monetary targeting to in-
fluence the publics expectations of future infla-
tion and to provide the public with a standard
of monetary policy that can be easily monitored
to assess the credibility of the Bank’s commit-
ment to price stability. Targeting a monetary ag-
gregate helps to reduce the economic cost of ex-
pectation errors about inflation that cause flue-
tuations in output and employment, and allows
the central bank to establish a reputation for
commitment to price stability. This reputation
helps to further reduce inflation expecta-
tions.
Monetary targeting also permits the Bundes-
bank to deny responsibility for labor and output
market disequilibria, and to signal that mone-
tary policy will not be available as an instru-
ment of discretionary aggregate demand man-
agement. Both arguments arise from the basic
view—laid down in the Bank’s legal constitu-
tion—that the principal goal of German mone-
tary policy is price stability.~
Reasons for Exchange Rate
Management
Exchange rate management has been the se-
cond important determinant of Bundesbank
monetary policy during the iSSOs. Exchange
rate considerations arise from two grounds.
First, Germany’s membership in the EMS obli-
gates the l3undesbank to intervene in foreign ex-
change markets to maintain stable parities of
the DM with the other participating currencies;
these currencies are the French franc, the
Belgian franc, the Dutch guilder, the Italian lira,
the Irish ~Ufltfr and the Danish korner.~Under
the EMS arrangement, member central banks
are required to intervene without limits if neces-
sary, to keep exchange rates within target zones
of ± 2.25 percent (± 6 percent for the Era)
around predetermined cenftal parities.
Second, the Bundesbank has often argued that
intervention in the DM-doilar market is neces-
sary at times to maintain “orderly” market con-
ditions; that is, to dampen exchange rate fluctua-
tions perceived to be unwarranted by the
prevailing basic economic conditions or funda-
mentals’ While the Bundesbank has repeatedly
denied having specific dollar targets for such in-
terventions, the concept of unwarranted ex-
change rate movements implies that some funda-
mental value of the exchange rate is being con-
sidered and serves as a target for interventions.
3See e.g. Bundesbank, Monthly Report February 1975, An-
nual Report for 1975, SchIes~nger(1979, 1983).
4For a recent review of the European Monetary System,
see Fratianni and von Hagen (1990)- German law places
the authority to participate in international exchange rate
arrangements wah the Ministry of Finance, not the
Bundesbank. One may, therefore, argue that the obliga-
tions imphed by the EMS were imposed on the Bank. n-
deed, the Bundesbank strongly opposed the formation of
the EMS.
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Monetary Control and Exchange
Rate Management
The link between exchange rate policies and
monetary control arises from the central bank’s
balance sheet. Domestic monetary control is
achieved primarily by controlling the growth
rate of the monetary base—total bank reserves
plus currency in circulation—at an appropriate
rate. The monetary base, from the sources’ side,
consists of various domestic assets and the cen-
tral bank’s stock of international reserves. Ex-
change i’ate control requires intervention in
foreign exchange markets: purchases and sales
of foreign assets which change the international
reserves component of the base. Consequently,
to assess the extent to which exchange rate
policies affect domestic monetary control, one
must answer the question of how much foreign
exchange interventions affect the growth of the
monetary base. This is called the “sterilization”
issue. Only if foreign exchange interventions are
“sterilized” completely, that is, have no effect on
monetary base growth, will exchange rate poli-
cies not impede domestic monetary control.
Otherwise, foreign exchange market interven-
tions have some impact on the growth of the
monetary base, and, consequently, on domestic
monetary control. Sterilization of foreign ex-
change market interventions requires offsetting
Monetary Targeting with Exchange
Bate Constraints
The monetary policy regime prevailing in Ger-
many in the 1980s can best be characterized as
one of monetary targeting with EMS and US.
dollar exchange rate constraints. Did these con-
straints prevent the Bundesbank from reaching
its monetary targets? Table 1, which reports the
monetary targets and realized growth rates in
Germany since 1979, provides a preliminary
look at the answer to this question. During
these years, the Bundesbank met its target on
five occasions, and missed its target on five oc-
casions. Money growth was too slow in 1980
and 1981, and too fast in 1986 to 1988. The
table also presents some qualitative information
about the performance of the mark vis-avis the
dollar and in the EMS during the previous
years. Here, a ‘strong” position of the mark is
typified by an appreciation of the mark and
sales of DM reserves against foreign currency in
the relevant market; the opposite is true for a
“weak” position- A mixed” position indicates
that the mark switched between strong” and
“weak” during the year.
The Relationship Between sales or purchases of domestic assets, such that
the total base remains unchanged.
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Figure 1 illustrates these qualitative characteri-
zations. The upper part of the figure shows an
index of the DM-dollar exchange rate (red-line)
and a weighted index of the DM exchange rates
in the EMS (black-line). ‘the lower part of figure
1 shows an index of the Bundesbanks net
foreign asset position (red line) excluding net
claims on the European Monetary Cooperation
Fund (EMCF), and an index of its net claims on
the EMCF (black line). Changes in these two
foreign asset positions reflect the Bank’s inter-
ventions in the dollar market and in EMS cur-
rencies, respectively. During 1980 and most of
1981, the dollar was rising and net foreign assets
fell due to intervention supporting the mark.
The mark’s exchange rate in the EMS remained
flat, but net claims on the EMCF felL too. From
1982 to the end of 1984, the dollar kept rising,
while the mark appreciated steadily in the EMS.
The two net foreign asset positions oscillated
with little apparent trend. With the dollar’s
decline from early 1985 to the end of 1987, a
period of intervention to support the dollar
began reflected in the increase in net foreign
assets during that period. As the mark remained
strong in the EMS, net claims on the EMCF
began to rise, too. Finally, in 1988k the mark
was flat in the EMS, while the dollar was
stronger again and the Bank heavily sold dollar
assets.
Table I reveals a clear pattern in the connec~
tion of exchange rate performance and monetary
targeting. There are four years, 1980, and
1985-87, when the mark’s movements against
both the dollar and the EMS currencies were in
the same direction. Each of these years is
followed by one in which the monetary target
was violated, 1981 and 1986-88. Conversely,
each year in which the mark’s performance
against the dollar was different from its perfor-
mance in the EMS was followed by a year in
which the monetary target was achieved. Since
the marks 1980 weakness against both already
began in late 1979, the slight undershooting of
the monetary target in 1980 fits into the same
pattern. Note that the failures to meet monetary
targets in each case were consistent in direction
with the previous exchange market operations
reflected in Figure 1: undershooting the targets
in 1980 and 1981 followed a period of net sales
of foreign assets, overshooting the targets in
19&&88 followed periods of net purchases of
foreign assets by the Bundesbank.
Table I suggests that the pursuit of exchange
rate objectives was associated with a failure to
achieve the monetary targets in Germany. How-
ever, the importance of the Bundesbanks ex-
change rate constraints seems to depend on
whether the mark is moving in a similar or
dissimilar direction in the dollar market and the
EMS. Moreover, the link between the foreign
exchange market operations and the growth
rate of the money supply is not immediate; it in-
volves time Tags, although the lag is not neces-
sarily as long as one year. The following section
explains these qualifications in more detail.
MONETARY BASE CONTROL IN
GERMANY
Equation I below describes the monetary
base, B, by three net positions on the sources
side: assets in EMS currencies (IRE), dollar de-
nominated assets (IR$), which, for simplicity, in-
clude gold) reserves in the International
Monetary Fund (IME) plus Special Drawing
Rights (SORs) and other foreign assets, and
domestic assets (D).~
(1) B IR$ + IRE + I)
A characteristic of the German financial sys-
tem is that the domestic component consists
almost entirely of Bundesbank loans to domestic
commercial banks. Tn contrast to other major
central banks, the Bundesbanks portfolio of
open market paper—government securities and
Treasury bills—makes up only a very small frac-
tion of its assets. The structure of the sources
of base money is illustrated by table 2, which
shows the base and the percentage shares of its
main components for the period of 1978 to
1988. At the end of 1978, international reserves
51n practice, RE consists of net claims of the Bundesbank
against the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF),
which pools reserves available for exchange market in-
tervention n the EMS contributed by the participating cen-
tral banks. Participating central banks can obtain strong-
currency reserves for obligatory interventions supporting
their own currency from the EMCF, which leads to an in-
crease n the net foreign asset position of the strong-
currency central bank. Conversely, f the latter intervenes
to support the weak currency, it will transfer the acquired
weak-currency reserves to the EMCF, again resulting in an
increased net claim position. These rules of the EMS were
designed to assure symmetry” of nterventions, ie. that ft
does not matter which bank intervenes.
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accounted for nearly two thirds of Ihe base.
That share declined to about 45 percent at the
end of 1981. Jt climbed again from 38 to 51 per-
cent during 1987 and fell sharply in 1988.
Table 2 distinguishes the three most impor-
tant types of loan operations in the domestic
component: discount credit (DISC), Lombard
credit (LOMB} and repurchase agreements
(REPOs). In Germany, discount credit is rationed
and the discount rate is kept consistently below
money market rates, and commercial banks
have additional incentives to fully utilize their
discount quola.6 Consequently, the Bundesbank
can tightly control the quantity of discount
credit. Discount credit is collateralized with
trade bills and has a fixed maturity of up to
90 days.
Lombard credit, in contrast, is freely accessi-
ble to banks under normal circumstances at a
rate that is kept higher than money market
rates. The Bundesbank may, however, impose
quantitative restrictions on Lombard credit also.
Lombard credit, which is collateralized with
trade bills, securities and Treasury bills and can
be repaid at any time, is a more flexible refi-
nancing instrument than discount credit for
commercial banks.
Repurchase agreements are loans to commer-
cial banks collateralized with securities, trade-
bills or foreign assets.7 Tt’ypically, they have fixed
maturities between three and 30 days and are
availab’e only at the Bundesbank’s discretion.
The table shows that REPOs gained importance
during the 1980s.
The two remaining components of the
domestic sources of the German monetary base
shown in table 2 are the Bundesbanks stock of
open market paper, securities issued by the Fed-
eral or State Governments, the Federal Railroad
6For example, an individual bank’s quota may be reduced if
t has not been exhausted for some time. This practice im-
plies that vahations in the discount rate have no direct rn-
pact on the money supply. The important variable deter-
mining the quantity of discount credit is the total size of
discount quota.
‘The official terms for these operations, ‘open market
operations with repurchase agreements,” is misleading in
that their economic nature is a loan to a commercial bank,
using a bank’s asset as collateraL That is, the Bundes-
bank does not purchase or sell securities or trade bills in
these operations. See Bundesbank (1985).
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or the Federal Post Office (SEC), and the net
Treasury bill position (MOB).~The Bank can
issue ‘i’reasury bills, Mobilisierungs-und-
Liquidifdtspapiere” on its own initiative, but on-
iy up to the amount of JiM 16.5 billion. During
the period under consideration, the combined
share of MOB and SEC never exceeded 7 per-
cent of the base.
An important consequence of the Bundes-
banks asset structure is that the domestic com-
ponent, D, is controlled mainly via loans to
domestic banks. For this purpose, the Bundes-
bank has developed a two-stage strategy.9 It is
based on the decomposition of the domestic
component into a permanent part (P) and a
transitory part (T):
(2) D P + T.
The permanent part (P) is used to achieve the
desired trend growth of the domestic compo-
nent over a time horizon of several months.
The main policy instruments for its control are
purchases and sales of securities (SEC), reserve
requirements, the discount rate and discount
quota.1°
The transitory component (T) is used to con-
trol the short-term growth of the monetary
base with regard to current money market con-
ditions. Here) the main policy instruments are
the issue and redemption of Treasury bills
(MOB)~repurchase agreements, including loans
collateralized with foreign assets (REPO) and
Lombard credit (LOMB).”
Variations in T are geared primarily at reduc-
ing short-run fluctuations in the interbank rate
for overnight centraT bank funds, the Bundes-
bank’s principal operating target for monetary
control.” The Bundesbank stresses the short-
run character of these operations by calling
them “reversible money market operations.’
Reversible money market operations have
typical maturities between two and thirty days;
only recently has the Bundesbank introduced
repurchase agreements thai extend over two
months. Under the current two-stage strategy,
increases or decreases of the transitory compo-
nent are generally reversed after some time.
That is, they are neither intended nor permitted
to have a lasting impact on the total domestic
component or on the base. The notable excep-
tion to this policy design was the increase in
REPO during 1984/85, when the Bundesbank
decided to increase the stock of REPO to gain




CASE OF THE BUNDESBANK
In view of equations 1 and 2, we can now
write the change in the monetary base during a
period t as:
(3) AB, = AIR, + AP, + AT~,
where AIR~(= AIRS1 + AIREI) is the change in
the total international reserves component. Con-
sider now the impact of an exchange market in-
tervention1 say, to support the dollar. This re-
quires an increase in foreign assets, MR~> 0.
Under the two-stage control procedure de-
scribed above, the Bundesbank may simultane-
ously reduce the transitory component if it
wants to neutralize the immediate effect of the
intervention on the monetary base. Thus, we
may assume:
(4) AT, = ~MR, +v,,
where v IS a random variable that represents
all other changes in the transitory component.
Inserting (4) into (3) yields:
(5) AS, = (1 + t)AJR, ++ v,.
~MOBis the difference between Equalization Claims” on
the Federal Government and Liabi}ifles to Banks from Is~
su}ng MobUization and Liquidity Paper” in the Bundesbank
balance sheet.
9For detailed discussions, see Dudler (1988), Neumann
(1988).
10Note that SEC and discount credit pohcies operate on the
supply side of base money; reserve requirements mpact
on ts demand.
“Loans collateralized with foreign assets, foreign exchange
swaps—the combination of a foreign exchange operation
in the spot market with the opposite operation ri the for-
ward market—and deposit policy—temporary transfers
of central bank deposits of the Federal Government into
and out of the banking sector—are addffional, but less im-
portant, components of T. Loans collateralized with foreign
assets and foreign exchange swaps do not change the
Bundesbank’s net foreign asset position. See Bundesbank
(1985).
12
See von Hagen (1988).
‘3See Bundesbank, Monthly Report, October 1985.
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If ~ = —1, the intervention is fully sterilized in
the current period: There is no current effect
on the base.
The two-stage monetary control strategy im-
plies, however, that things do not end here. The
initial decrease in the transitory component is
reversed during subsequent periods. As this
happens, the effect of the initial intervention on
the growth of the monetary base is gradually
realized. Therefore, even if foreign exchange in-
terventions are sterilized completely in the cur-
rent period, the growth of the base need not be
independent of foreign exchange interventions
in the longer run. Independence of base growth
from foreign exchange interventions in the long-
er run can only be achieved by counteracting
their effects with appropriate changes in the
permanent component.
As a consequence of its control strategy for
the monetary base the Bundesbank has devel-
oped a two-stage sterilization procedure.14 The
essential point is to distinguish between short-
FUfl and long-run sterilization. The former is
brought about by variations of the transitory
component as discussed above; the latter re-
quires changes in the permanent component. To
illustrate the two-stage procedure, let the
change in the permanent component be:
(6) AP = u, + I d~AIR~_
where u denotes changes in the permanent
component, independent of exchange rate
policies. Here, the sum ~ d~determines the de-
gree of sterilization in the long run, and the in-
dividual d~parameters show how the steriliza-
tion with the permanent component is distri-
buted over time. The effect of a one-time in-
tervention in period t on base money growth in
the current period can be represented as:
(7) B = + (1+t)AIR +
while the long-run effect is apparent from:
(8) B~+~—B,= (u~5 ++ (1 4 O)A1R1.
Equations (7) and (8) highlight the different
roles of short-run and long-run sterilization in
influencing the growth of the monetary base.
Short-run sterilization reduces the immediate
impact of an intervention on the monetary base
and serves to distribute its effect more smoothly
145ee Dudler (1988).
over time. Only long-run sterilization, however,
can make monetary base growth independent of
the consequences of exchange rate policies. This
requires I d~= — 1, and is independent of the
degree of short-run sterilization. For the conflict
between monetary targeting and exchange rate
targeting) the degree of long-run sterilization is
the relevant issue because it determines the
consequences of exchange market interventions
on money growth over time.
Two conclusions can be drawn at this point.
First, the strong negative correlations between
contemporaneous or short-lagged changes in the
domestic component and the international re-
serves component of the base pointed out by
Camen (1986), Obstfeld (1983), Roubini (1988),
Mastropasqua et al. (1988) and Bofinger (1988)
only tell us about a high degree of short-run
sterilization. Given the control strategy of the
Bundesbank, these results per se have no im-
plications for the independence of the Bundes-
banks domestic monetary policy goals from its
exchange rate policies in the EMS or in the
coordination efforts of the G5.
Second, even if the degree of short-run
sterilization is high, foreign exchange interven-
tions can produce accelerations or decelerations
in base and money over time simply because
changes in the transitory component are revers-
ed only gradually and with a lag of several
periods. Therefore, the lag pattern found in
table 1 is consistent with this distinction bet-
ween short-run and long-run sterilization.
Offsetting Interventions
In practice interventions may not seriously en-
danger monetary control even if they are not
sterilized in the long run. For example, different
interventions can offset each other and thus
neutralize their individual effects on monetary
base growth. Such ‘offsetting’ inlerventions can
occur either over time or across markets.
Offsetting interventions that occur over time
are possible if in the absence of intervenlions
the exchange rate is subject to purely tran-
sitory, random fluctuations of mean zero, while
the underlying ‘fundamental exchange rate is
constant. If the central bank decides to dampen
exchange rate movements by intervening in the
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foreign exchange market, the resulting interven-
tions would produce purely transitory fluctua~
tions in the international reserves component.
Since these fluctuations average out to zero
over time, they contribute nothing to the
growth of the monetary base over time, even
without sterilization.”
Unfortunately, the fundamental exchange rate
is not constant, as illustrated by the large
swings in the DM-doflar rate and the persistent
appreciation of the mark in the EMS since 1981
shown in figure 1. Worse than that, the fun~
damental rate is not known. Therefore, every
change in the exchange rate can represent a
fundamental change, a transitory change, or the
sum of both. Thus) interventions to smooth only
transitory fluctuations require knowledge of
what is transitory and what is not, knowledge
which is not available to poTicyrnakers. Misinter-
preting fundamental for transitory movements
will lead to interventions that do not average
out over time, and therefore cannot be steriliz-
ed by the transitory base component a1one.’~
The dual exchange rate constraints in the
EMS and the dollar market create an opportuni-
ty for the second kind of offsetting interven-
tions. This could occur if, for example, interven-
tion in the EMS is required to bring the mark’s
value in other EMS currencies down, while the
mark is weak against the dollar at the same
time. Intervention in the EMS then requires
purchases of reserves, AIRE > 0, while stabiliz~
ing the mark against the dollar requires sales of
dollar assets, aIR$ < 0. Such offsetting opera-
tions across the two markets seem to have oc-
curred frequently between 1982 and 1985. For
example the Bundesbank reports that “the con-
siderable inflows of foreign exchange from the
EMS area did not pose any problem for Ger~
many on balance because the Bundesbank
simultaneously sold heavily in the dollar market
in the form of smoothing interventions in favor
of the Deutsche Mark.”” In the figure; this is
most clearly visible during 1982. Since the
monetary base is affected only by the net
change of the total international reserves com~
ponent, the sterilization problem is considerably
alleviated in this situation.
Thus, with two exchange rate constraints, the
consequences of exchange rate policies for
monetary targeting depend on the relative
movement of the mark in the two markets.
Specifically, the Bundesbank’s exchange rate
constraints are more likely to jeopardize mone-
tary control if the mark is moving in the same
direction in both markets, because this limits
the possibility of offsetting interventions across
markets. This suggests that empirical studies of
the degree of sterilization by the J3undesbank
should distinguish between periods of equal or
opposite movements of the mark against the




In this section 1 estimate the degree of sterih
ization of foreign exchange interventions for the
Bundesbank over the period of 1979-88. In con-
trast to earlier studies, I distinguish between
short~and long-run sterilization and look at
subperiods according to the mark’s relative
strength.
The Data
The analysis is based on monthly data for
changes in the monetary base and its sources
from the Bundesbank’s Monthly Reports. The
data are calculated from averages of daily
figures and are not seasonally adjusted. Changes
in the international reserves component, AIR,
are measured as “foreign exchange inflows to
or outflows from the Bundesbank.” These
foreign exchange flows are reported in actual,
effective transaction values and measure
precisely their effect on the base. This is the
‘5They do, however, ncrease the variability of base growth.
Statements by the Bundesbank indicate that this s indeed
its paradigm for exchange rate policies with regard to the
dollar: Interventions are geared to dampen erratic” fluc-
tuations of the DM-dollar rate around the fundamental rate.
See e.g. Dudler (1988), p. 69, SchoIl (1983), p. 120.
‘°TheBundesbank has admitted that such interpretation er~
rors have led to undesirable monetary developments on
numerous occasions. See Bundesbank, ‘V~erzigJahre
Deutsche Mark,” Monthly Report, May 1988.
“Annual Report for 1981, p. 76; see also Annual Report for
1982, p. 72, Scholl (1983), p. 124.
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main advantage of using these data rather than
balance sheet data, where, in accordance with
German accounting laws, international reserves
are reported at constant exchange rates
throughout each year.18 One problem arising
with these data—as well as with balance sheet
data—is that they do not distinguish between
changes in international reserves due to in-
tervention and changes due to other sources.
Even without intervention, the net foreign asset
position of the Bundesbank would change over
time as interest income on foreign assets is cal-
lected and exchanges of DM for dollars takes
place in regular business with U.S. armed
forces stationed in Germany.1°However, in the
present context of testing for short-run and
long-run sterilization, this does not pose a
serious problem.20
For interventions in EMS currencies, balance
sheet data must be used. IRE is measured by
the Bundesbank’s net claims on the EMCF in
connection with the EMS. Dollar market in-
terventions are then obtained from AIR - AIRE
= AIRs. Finally, to obtain an empirical counter-
part of the transitory base component (T), we
use the bank’s ‘<balance of short.term assistance
measures on the money market” and add Lom-
bard loans outstanding.” The monthly changes
in these variables are normalized by the lagged
monetary base to obtain scale-free variables.
Regression Equations
I estimate the following regression model for
the transitory component:
(9) AT = +1 ~ ~ + a1,12 AT~_2+
j~i j3~,aIR$~÷ + ~ AIRE+_~+ Vt.
The model has an autoregressive part and two
sets of regressors, the two intervention vari-
ables AIRS and MilE. In equation 9, the param-
eter sums 1 J3,~and ! ~ estimate the total
degree of short-run sterilization achieved with
the transitory component, while the individual
coefficients /3~jand y111, show how this is
distributed over the current and the following
months.
The model for the monetary base is:
K
(10) M~= it
2 + I a2~AB~~ + a2112 AB~~1 +
N M
1 #2,1 à1R$~_1+~ y~ AIRE1~ +
Here, the sums of parameters ~ 1121 and
I y1~measure the total impact of a given inter-
vention on the base; fl2,~and y2,~reflect its dis-
tribution over time.
I estimate equations (9) and (10) over the total
period, 1979 to 1988fr and three subperiods.22
These subperiods, while necessarily somewhat
arbitrary, were chosen in accordance with the
characterizations shown in table 1: 1980-81 was
a period in which the mark was generally weak
against both the dollar and the EMS currencies,
1985-87 was a period in which the mark was
mostly strong against both currency groups;
1982 to 1984 was a period in which the mark
was generally weak against the dollar and
strong against the EMS currencies.
Preliminary estimates of the two equations
were run to select the appropriate lag lengths
for the regressors. The preferred specifications
have k = K = 3 lags for the autoregressive part
IBSee Roubini (1988) for a discussion of valuauon problems
with balance sheet data.
‘9See e.g. Monthly Report, November 1988, p. 32.
20W0 may interpret AIR as the sum of the true effect of in-
terventions plus a measurement error from other changes
n nternational reserqes. U is well-known that such errors-
n-vañables bias regression coefficients toward zero,
unless the covariance of the measurement error and the
equation error s positive and argo relative to the magni-
tude of the coefficient being estimated. In tests of a short-
run sterilization coefficient of negative one, and of no long-
run effect of AIR on the base, the test is biased against
full short-run and in favor of full long-run sterflization.
Since the test results accept the former and reject the lat-
ter, they are actually stronger than indicated by the
nominal significance levels used.
21A11 data except IRE are obtained from the Bundesbank’s
table 111.3. IRE is taken from the Bank’s table IX.6a.
22We estimate equations 6 and 8 together with an auxiliary
equation for total interventions, AIR, or dollar market in-
terventions, AIfl$, using a three-stage least-squares (3SLS)
estimator. The equation for MR$ is a regression of these
interventions on a set of instruments, namely lagged in-
terventions, lagged changes in the OM-dollar rate and
lagged German-U.S. interest rate different~aIs for call
money and government securities. The use of these in-
struments allows us to solve the sirnultan&ty problem that
arises in equaflons 7 and 9, as exchange rates and hence
nterventions may be contemporaneous’y affected by
changes in the base. Furthermore, the use of the 3SLS
estimator is appropriate to account for the likely correlation
of the error terms u and w~ For the EMS intervenflons, an
instrumental estimator was not used because there were
no appropriate instruments.
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and m = n = 1 lag for the intervention vari-
ables in the transitory component model) and
N = 6 and M= 4 lags for dollar and EMS inter-
ventions in the base equation. These specifica-
tions were chosen because the inclusion of
more lags did not improve the models ex-
planatory power, while further restrictions
reduced it
Shorfrfiun Sterilization
Table 3 summarizes the result for the tran-
sitory component equation. The upper panel in-
dicates that the regressions are highly signifi-
cant for all samples and explain monthly
changes in the transitory component fairly well.
The AR(6) statisde shows no signs of residual
autocorrelation. The significant negative sum of
the AR coefficients agrees with the reversibility
of the short-run operations involved. The only
exception in the subsample 1982-84 where the
own lags are not significant, presumably reflects
the Bundesbanks attempt to build up a larger
portfolio of loans to banks with repurchase
agreements during this period. Both sets of in-
tervention variables appear highly significant. In
all subsamples and the total sample1 the sums of
the short-run sterilization coefficients j3~and
have the expected negative signs.
Based on equation 9, the hypothesis of full
short-run sterilization is given by:
(11) ! == —1.
The lower panel of table 3 reports the results
of the tests for short-run sterilization. We test
the hypothesis of full short-run sterilization
separately for each type of intervention, and
jointly. The hypothesis is not rejected for the
total sample. Only for interventions in the EMS
is full short-run sterilization rejected in the two
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suhsarnples with equal relative stances of the
mark, 1980-81 and 1985-87. The hypothesis of
full short-run sterilization of dollar market in-
terventions is never rejected.
Long~RunSterilization
Table 4 presents a similar summary of the
results for the monetary base. Again, all regres-
sions are found highly significant and without
residual autocorrelation. When tested separate-
ly, the two sets of intervention variables enter
these equations significantly only in the 1985-87
subsample. However, if we test the significance
of the dollar and the EMS interventions jointly,
23
The joint tests yield the following F-ratios (degrees of
freedom in parentheses): 1.5 (10,325) for the total sample,
2.1 * (1040) for 1980-81, 1.3 (10,76) for 1982-84, and
4.8* * (10,76) for 1985-87.
we find that the interventions together had
significant consequences for German monetary
base growth in 1980-81 and 1985~87.23The sum
of coefficients ~ and
1
1j have the anticipated,
positive signs in the total sample and these two
subsamples.
The lower panel of this table reports the
results of testing for full long-run sterilization~
N M
(12) 1 = 0, 1 = 0.
We reject full long-run sterilization for both
types of interventions in the total sample and
the two subsamples when the mark’s move-
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ments against the dollar and the EMS were in
the same direction. Thus, the impact of foreign
exchange interventions on monetary base
growth was significant in times when the two
exchange rate constraints required intervention
in the same direction24
The empirical results for short-run and long.
run sterilization are thus very different. In con-
trast to short-run sterilization, long-run steriliza-
tion, which is the more relevant issue for mone-
tary policy, did not generally hold throughout
the 1980s. The shaded insert on the opposite
page illustrates how this important conclusion is
missed if the analysis fails to recognize the
Bundesbank’s distinction between short-run and
long-run sterilization.
Do EMS Interventions and Dollar
Interventions Have the Same
Effects?
Did the Bundesbank’s sterilization procedures
treat interventions in the EMS significantly dif-
ferent from interventions in the dollar market?
To answer this question, we test the hypotheses:
(13)~~ =
N M
~ y and 1 Pz,i =
meaning that the extent of short- and long-run
sterilization is the same for both types of in-
terventions. The F-statistics pertaining to these
tests for the total sample and the three sub-
samples are all well below the 10 percent
significance Ievels.25 Thus, we do not reject the
hypothesis that, apart from differences in tim-
ing, sterilization is the same on both markets.
Even though the extent of sterilization was
the same in the dollar market and the EMS,
dollar market and EMS intervention had dif-
ferent implications for monetary growth in Ger-
many during the 1980s. This result is due to the
marked differences in the time profiles of these
interventions. EMS interventions have occurred
on a large scale mostly around realignments of
the central parities. As the realignments invoh’-
ed revaluations of the mark, the Bundesbank
generally experienced large inflows of interna-
tional reserves before realignments, due to in-
terventions supporting weak currencies. But the
new central parities were usually chosen such
that the mark would be temporarily in a rela-
tively weak position in the EMS after the re-
alignment. The realignments triggered outflows
of reserves, which offset the initial expan-
sionary effect.26 This general pattern is clearly
demonstrated in figure 1.
Similar, self-reverting tendencies did not, in
general, occur for interventions in the dollar
market. The long-lasting changes in dollar
reserves shown in figure 1 suggest that in-
terventions in the dollar market, especially in
the two critical periods of 1980-81 and 1985-87,
had more permanent effects. These observations
indicate that the monetary control implications
of EMS and dollar market interventions have
been very different: non-sterilized EMS in.
terventioris cause temporary deviations of
monetary base growth from what is warranted
by the monetary target. In contrast, dollar
market interventions cause more permanent
deviations and, particularly in the two critical
periods have contributed significantly to the





The fact that the Bundesbank fully sterilizes
foreign exchange interventions in the short run
but does not generally do so in the long run
can be interpreted in two ways. Incomplete
long-run sterilization may reflect the lack of suf-
24
Finding a significant impact of interventions on monetary
base growth does not necessarily imply that interventions
became an obstacle to monetary targeting. For example, if
the Bundesbank wanted to hold a constant share of its
total assets in international reserves, the latter would have
to grow in line with the monetary base (e.g. Scholl (1983),
p. 1201. In this case, such reversed causality between
base growth and growth of international reserves could
lead to similar regression results as those above. How-
ever, we know from figure 1 that the net international
reserves posftions of the Bundesbank were subject to
large swings, particularly during the years when long-run
sterilization did not occur, which makes this interpretation
implau&ble.
25The following F-values are computed for this test (degrees
of freedom in parentheses). Equal short-run sterilization:
0.2 (1,325), 2.8(1,40), 0.1 (1,76), 2.2 (1,76) for 1979-88,
1980-81, 1982-84, 1985-87, respectively. Equal long-run
sterilization: 0.0 (1,325), 0.0 (1,40), 0.1 (1,76), and 1.1
(1,76). For the base equation with shifting parameters, the
F-value for equal long-run sterilizatbn is 0.2(1,315) for the
interactive dummy terms.
26See Bundesbank, Monthly Report, November 1988, p. 34
27This accords well wfth Dudlers (1988) assessment of the
EMS and dollar market constraints. The resuft for the EMS
also accords well with the findings about German dominance
in the EMS in Fratianni and von Hagen (1990).
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ficiently effective monetary control instruments,
i.e., an institutional deficiency. Alternatively, in-
complete long-run sterilization may reflect that,
under certain circumstances, the Bundesbank is
willing to give in on its monetary target and
lend more weight to exchange rate considera-
tions in its decisions. The Bank itself has argued
repeatedly that the latter is true.28 Specifically,
violations of the monetary target ranges have
been justified e~post as necessary to reduce ex-
change rate pressures. From this perspective,
the results tell us something about how the
relative weights of exchange rate targets and
the monetary target in the Bank’s decisions vary
over time: The monetary target dominates as
long as the mark performs differently in the
EMS than against the dollar, but the monetary
target becomes subordinate if the mark is either
strong or weak against both currency groups.2°
The estimates in table 4 indicate that, under
these circumstances, an intervention of, say,
DM 1 billion, will raise the monetary base per-
manently by DM 500 to 600 million over the
next two quarters.
The Effectiveness of “Sterilized”
Intervention
The empirical finding of a significant dif-
ference between short-run and long-run
sterilization of foreign exchange interventions
also sheds some light on how interventions af-
fect exchange rates. Asset market theories of
exchange rate determination hold that sterilized
interventions have no exchange rate effect if
market participants regard assets in the coun-
tries concerned as perfect substitutes. The
reason is that such interventions do not effec-
tively change the composition of private in-
vestors’ portfolios, and, hence, cannot change
relative asset prices. Leaving the two money
supplies unaffected, such interventions merely
exchange perfect substitutes. On this basis, the
assertion of earlier studies that the Bundesbank
perfectly sterilizes interventions in the dollar
263ee SchoIl (1983), p. 124, Dudler (1988), p. 74, Schles-
inger (1988), p. 11, Bundesbank, Monthly Report, May
1988, p. 20, and Rieke (1984), p. 53.
29Neumann (1984) concludes that the Bank raises the
weight on the monetary target in response to ncreasing
exchange rate uncertainty.
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market would imply that such interventions are
ineffective, since the degree of capital mobility
between Germany and the U.S. is high and it
seems plausible to assume that short-term, in-
terest bearing assets in the two countries are
very close substitutes.
However, the Bundesbank does find sterilized
interventions in the dollar market effective, and
recent empirical research confirms its c1aim~°.
The distinction between perfect short-run and
imperfect long-run sterilization becomes crucial
in resolving this puzzle. If market participants
understand that full sterilization holds only in
the short run, while long-run sterilization is—or
may be—incomplete, interventions would
change market participants’ expectations about
the future growth of the money supply, and
this change in expectations would lead to ex-
change rate movements even if the interven-
tions were fully sterilized initially. That is,
sterilized interventions act as a signal about
future central bank behavior. This is the
essence of Mussa’s (1981) expectations argument
of sterilized interventions.31 As Dominguez
(1989) points out, market participants generally
seem to be aware of central batik activities in
the dollar market, so that they are able to read
the intended signal. This lends some further
plausibility to the expectations argument.
The Bundesbank and the EMS
The results provide some insights into the
functioning of the EMS during the 1980s. They
reject the popular hypothesis that sterilization
of EMS interventions makes German monetary
policy independent from policies in the EMS
and puts the burden of adjustment to balance
of payments problems on weak currency coun-
tries.32 The evidence suggests that the long-run
independence of German money supply growth
from influences in the EMS, shown in Fratianni
and von Hagen (1990), should be rather at-
tributed to the way realignments have been
engineered in most cases. Our results suggest
that, with its dual exchange rate constraint, the
Bundesbank may be more likely to accept or
even pressure for realignments to revaluate the
strong mark in the EMS when the dollar is
weak than when it is high, since the mark’s
strength in both markets reduces the scope for
offsetting interventions. This may explain why
realignments have indeed been preceded by
periods of dollar weakness in most cases.33
CONCLUSIONS
Our results can be summarized as follows:
Over the entire period under consideration, I
cannot reject the hypothesis that the Bundes-
bank sterilizes foreign exchange interventions
completely in the short run. However, complete
intervention sterilization does not generally oc-
cur in the long run. Foreign exchange market
interventions affect German monetary base
growth significantly when the mark’s move-
ments against the dollar and the EMS curren-
cies are in the same direction, that is, when the
mark is relatively strong or relatively weak in
both markets at the same time. This was the
case in five out of the 10 years from 1979 to
1988. Tn contrast, exchange rate policies have
no significant effect on German monetary con-
trol when the mark has unequal relative posi-
tions on the two markets. This suggests that,
generally, persistent net intervention affects
monetary control.
The results indicate that the Bundesbank’s
dollar policies and participation in coordinated
interventions since 1985 have contributed
significantly to the excess growth of the Ger-
man money supply, relative to the Bank’s
monetary targets in the second half of the
1980s. ‘I’he present revival of inflation in
Germany—in the spring of 1989, inflation in
terms of the cost of living index was at an an-
nual rate of 2.7 percent, up from zero in
1987—marks one cost of this monetary over-
expansion and, consequently, of the policies
leading to it. This result suggests that interna-
tional policy coordination schemes that focus on
exchange rates are more costly than they were
previously believed to be.
30Dominguez (1989).
31Rieke (1984), p. 45, argues that the Bundesbank interprets
the etfecuveriess of sterflized intervention on the basis of a
signaling argument. The same argument from the Bank is
reported by Funabash~(1988), p. 34.
32G~avazziand Giovarinini (1987), p. 253.
33Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986).
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